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  Abstract: 
  Effective climate policy requires global emissions of greenhouse gases to be cut drastically, 
which in energy sectors can be achieved by lower emissions supply technologies, greater energy 
use efficiency, and substitution in demand. For policy to be efficient requires fairly uniform, 
pervasive emission pricing from taxes, permit trading, or hybrid combinations of the two, as well 
as significant government support for low-emission technologies.  We compare the kind of 
technology-focused climate policies currently adopted by Australia and the USA, the ‘Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate’ (AP6), against this ideal policy yardstick. 
  We find that they omit the need for emission pricing to achieve abatement effectively and 
efficiently; that they over-prescribe which abatement actions should be used most; that they make 
unrealistic assumptions about how much progress can be achieved by voluntarism and 
cooperation, in the absence of either adequate funding or mandatory policies; and that they 
unjustifiably contrast technology-focused policy and the Kyoto Protocol approach as the only two 
policies worth considering, and thus ignore other important options. 
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  Recognition is growing that climate change is a serious issue that needs to be addressed, and that 
global greenhouse gas emissions will need to be cut drastically by mid-century (Stern, 2006). 
Disagreement persists however over who should take action, when, and what policy mechanisms to 
use. 
 
  Australia has been a key player in the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate (AP6, after the six countries in the partnership: Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, 
United States). AP6 essentially is a voluntary agreement to promote cleaner energy technology.  Its 
principal stated purpose is to “create a voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to 
facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer term cost-
effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices” (DFAT 2006). Any contributions to funding are 
voluntary, and there are no commitments to specific outcomes, targets or timetables.   
 
  A focus on technology development is in line with a growing recognition that in order to achieve 
the deep cuts in global greenhouse emissions that will be necessary to stabilise atmospheric 
concentrations at ‘safe’ levels, fundamental shifts in energy systems will be necessary over the next 50 
years or so (EFF 2006).  However, the Australian government has excluded other key policy options.  
In particular, it has argued that the Kyoto Protocol approach of emissions targets and timetables is not 
working, and has ruled out the use of economic instruments such as permit trading or emissions taxes 
in Australia (DFAT 2006).  Yet at the time of writing, Australian debate on climate policy has been 
greatly reinvigorated by developments such as the Stern Review in the UK on the economics of 
climate change (Stern 2006), the (Australian) Prime Minister's nuclear energy review (PM&C 2006), 
and the Prime Minister's indication of a task group to review emissions trading (Howard 2006).  So 
Australian climate policy may well change rapidly.  
 
  Here we ask if technology-focused policy approaches, and current AP6 policy in particular, are on 
their own likely to be effective in reducing greenhouse gas emissions; and how they measure up 
against the yardstick of an effective and efficient climate policy.  In Section 2 below we explain what 
we contend are the necessary elements of an effective and efficient climate policy, citing only 
supporting literature.  Our arguments recognise that the Kyoto Protocol falls far short of effectiveness 
and efficiency, principally because it does not include all major emitters; that there is a key role for a 
substantial technology policy; and that there is no easy fix for global climate policy.  In Section 3 we 
describe the typical elements of technology-focused climate policy, drawing from Australian 
government sources and the policy and economic literature as well as official AP6 documents; 
critically review these against the elements of an effective and efficient policy; and discuss any  
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contentious points raised by Section 2.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The elements of effective and efficient climate policy 
 
2.1  Effectiveness: the need to cut total emissions of greenhouse gases 
 
  The starting point is that global, anthropogenic, net additions to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
of which most is carbon dioxide from fossil fuel burning, will cause and are already causing climate 
change, the speed and direction of which will be dangerous to most, if not all countries (IPCC 2001).  
This is no longer in serious dispute, though different shades of emphasis are noted below.  Since 
GHGs are long-lived, global pollutants and since global GDP is growing, effective climate policy 
must achieve significant reductions in global GHG emissions, not just in GHG intensities (emissions 
per dollar of GDP). To stabilise global GHG concentrations at levels that limit the risk of severe future 
climate change damage, annual global emissions will need to be reduced substantially in the coming 
decades. Stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations at 550 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 equivalent 
(around twice the pre-industrial level) is estimated to require a 25% reduction compared to current 
annual emissions by 2050, and a more ambitious target of 450 ppm a reduction of 70% below current 
levels (Stern 2006, xi). A halving in annual emissions by 2050 implies an average reduction of –
1.4%/yr, compared to average global growth over the last three decades of 1.7%/yr for CO2 from fossil 
fuels.
1 Combined with continued GDP growth, this means global economic activity must be rapidly 
‘de-carbonised’.   
 
  The need to reduce global emissions substantially means that all major emitters must play their 
part.  The United States currently accounts for 23% of annual global CO2 emissions, and China and the 
European Union for around 15% each. Historical contributions to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
are mainly from developed countries who also have much higher per capita emissions (average 11.3 
tons of CO2 per person/year in the OECD, compared to 2.3 t/person/year in the non-OECD). However, 
expected future annual emissions growth is predominantly from industrialising countries including 
China and India, so their involvement in efforts to reduce emissions is crucial.  Quite  how and when 
such involvement is to happen is the key conundrum of achieving strong collective action in global 
climate policy, with not all countries accepting the UNFCCC principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capabilities’, which requires developed countries to ‘take the 
lead in combating climate change’.  The need to include all major emitters of course cannot excuse 
small emitters, such as rich countries like Australia and Canada, from their responsibilities.  
                                                 
1 Data for CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production, 1972–2002, from World 




2.2  Efficiency, I: the need for emission pricing 
 
  A globally efficient policy requires emissions reductions at a similar marginal cost in all 
countries, and on all sources of emissions where control policies are practicable.  To achieve this 
efficiency, we (and many others, such as Stern 2006, xviii) contend that climate policy needs to use 
emission pricing as its centrepiece, though there also needs to be significant government spending on 
research into and development of new, low-emission technologies.  By emission pricing we mean 
creating a fairly pervasive, fairly uniform price incentive to reduce emissions.  The price is created by 
governments using either an emissions permit trading scheme within an overall emissions cap ("cap-
and-trade"), or an emissions tax (ideally charged only above some thresholds, as in Pezzey 2003), or 
some hybrid combination of the two.  Two noteworthy hybrids are the idea of international emissions 
trading within a maximum permit price (the "trigger price" of Pizer 2002, or "safety valve" of Jacoby 
and Ellerman 2004); and the closely-related plan in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) for an 
internationally coordinated emission price, but emissions trading only within countries.  The initial 
distribution of permits or thresholds under any of these schemes has a critical effect on equity, and 
absolutely should not be free.  A key, recent example of what not to do was the overwhelmingly free 
distribution of permits for the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which has resulted 
in billions of euros of windfall profits to electricity companies (Sijm et al 2006).  However, no further 
discussion of equity is warranted here, given our focus on effectiveness and efficiency.  What matters 
for these latter two criteria is that any emission pricing scheme should be fairly pervasive, which 
means not exempting significant emission sectors. 
 
  Using such created (not free) market forces is particularly important in GHG control because of 
three technical reasons neatly (if perhaps unwittingly) summarised by the Australian Foreign Minister 
in the context of CO2, the main GHG: 
  "...a ton of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has the same effect wherever it came from.  And 
likewise, a ton avoided has the same impact whether it is from reduced energy use, carbon capture 
and storage, renewable energy, or from trapping carbon dioxide in vegetation."  (Downer 2006) 
The first reason to use emission pricing is thus that because GHGs have the same effect wherever they 
come from, it is fully efficient to use the same price incentive everywhere,
2 and the inevitably varied 
market response to this cannot cause any localised environmental damage.  The second and third 
reasons are that there is a huge range of ways of abating GHG emissions and a correspondingly huge 
                                                 
2 "The imposition of a carbon dioxide penalty provides an incentive for producers to reduce their carbon dioxide 
emissions up to the point where the marginal abatement cost equals the carbon dioxide penalty."  (Matysek et al. 
2005, p5)  
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range of marginal abatement costs, but no cheap, practicable and universal options for end-of-pipe 
abatement technologies.  Together these mean that governments cannot know, but pervasive market 
forces can discover, where and how emissions should be reduced or abated most cheaply.  Marginal 
abatement costs vary between sources of GHGs as well as between countries, as shown in sectoral 
modelling of abatement actions (Weyant 1999, Matysek et al. 2005). Reducing coal combustion, 
which has the highest GHG emissions per unit of energy, in many instances is among the least costly 
abatement options, but other options exist at all parts of the marginal cost curve. This includes 
demand-side energy efficiency improvements, which can present a large share of low-cost abatement 
options, as shown for Australia by Allen Consulting Group (2004) and globally by the International 
Energy Agency (2006). So an efficient policy requires that a broad-based emission price signal is 
somehow established. Note however our qualification that price incentives would need to be "fairly 
pervasive, fairly uniform", allowing for less than full application of this ideal. 
 
  An important but often overlooked part of the efficiency argument for using market forces is that 
consumers will be better off if the prices of the goods and services they consume reflect the GHG 
effects of consumption.  This is a general result of allowing markets to work freely.  A simple thought 
experiment shows how it works.  Suppose emissions are increased by electricity use but decreased by 
spending on abatement; and that the government's existing policy is to spend a large sum directly on 
abating emissions, and raise the money for this from general taxation which leaves electricity 
consumption unaffected.  Now consider a move to a second policy with a small tax on electricity (thus 
shifting consumption towards other goods), and a more than offsetting reduction in general taxation, of 
a size so that spending on abatement is lower, but emissions are unchanged overall thanks to the shift 
away from electricity.  Society then benefits from the overall reduction in taxation.
3  And the benefits 
of market-led choices multiply when there are many different consumer products with different 
emission intensities, and many different ways of abating emissions. 
 
  However, the falls in fossil fuel output caused by pervasive emission pricing will inevitably be 
greatest for coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel.  With 48% of its total energy consumption supplied 
by coal, Australia is the most coal-intensive country of the AP6, which is itself more coal-intensive 
(38%) than the world as a whole (26%) (figures from US Energy Information Administration 2004, 
International Energy Annual).   So coal-intensive industries will inevitably exert pressure on 
governments to resist emission pricing.  But because it is efficient, pricing remains an essential part of 
the best, long-run solution for any nation's economy, and can be made politically acceptable by giving 
adequate compensation to coal-intensive sectors. 
 
                                                 
3 See the Appendix for a formal proof.  
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2.3  Efficiency, II: the need for technology policy 
 
  We have left a key element of an effective and efficient climate policy till last: that of achieving 
enough innovation and deployment of new low emission technologies, and enough deployment of 
existing low emission technologies.
4  Almost everyone agrees that such technological innovation and 
deployment is vital if deep long-term cuts in GHG emissions are to be achieved in the most cost-
effective way.  There is also near-universal agreement that governments must play a key role in 
supporting innovation, because its benefits to society cannot be fully captured by those undertaking 
costly research and development (R&D) leading to innovation.  Government supports include patent 
laws; subsidies for private R&D, and perhaps prizes for innovation, and encouraging vertical R&D 
consortia to form (Montgomery and Smith 2006); and direct spending by government R&D agencies. 
 
  However, two important qualifications apply to adopting a focus on technology policy as the 
heart of climate policy.  One is that it costs serious money – just how much we discuss in Section 3 – 
and cannot be just a legal framework and exhortation.  The other is that vital as it is, technology policy 
is not enough on its own.  Emission pricing remains vital in providing incentives for deploying low-
emission technologies, whether old ones like insulation batts in construction, or the use of high-
efficiency coal-fired boilers in new power stations in China and India; or new technologies like carbon 
capture and storage (CCS, also known as geosequestration, see Metz et al. 2005). Subsidised 
technology development can bring down the cost of CCS, but commercially the technology will be 
just as unattractive at $25/tonne as at $125/tonne,
 5 if venting carbon dioxide to the atmosphere 
remains free. 
 
Emission pricing can also induce significant amounts of innovation.  After a wide-ranging review 
of the quite divergent literature on induced innovation, Popp (2006) concludes that earlier claims 
about the extent of innovation induced through emission pricing may have been over-optimistic, that 
support of R&D expenditure via subsidies or direct government financing will also be necessary, and 
that such expenditure will crowd out other R&D.  But his central conclusion is that an emission 
pricing signal is still vital for innovation: "[among] several important lessons for policymakers 
tempted to rely on technology as a cure-all for climate change...first, and most obvious, is that 
these technological gains will not occur without some policy signal to innovators that energy 
efficiency research will be profitable". 
 
                                                 
4 A third key element of policy is the removal of barriers to behavioural change (Stern 2006, xx), but this is 
not our focus here. 
5 All carbon prices are in 2000 US $ per tonne of CO2.  
 
 6
  In conclusion, an effective and efficient climate policy needs action by all major emitters, not 
excusing rich, small emitting countries from responsibility; a central role for emission pricing policies 
such as emissions trading, or an emission tax, or hybrids of the two; and significant government 
financial support for R&D of new, low-emission technologies.  We now use the above principles to 
examine recent technology-focused climate policies to assess their effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
 
3.  A critical review of technology-focused climate policy and recent 
Australian research 
 
  What we depict as "technology-focused climate policy" is neatly summarised by the AP6's 
founding Vision Statement (AP6 2005), and by the Charter, Communique and Work Plan it issued 
after its Inaugural Ministerial meeting in Sydney in January 2006 (AP6 2006). However, given AP6's 
uncertain future, we refer also to other, mainly Australian writings which have an independent 
existence.  We refer to current Australian climate policy as Australia's Position, as found in DFAT 
(2005), though this may of course have changed by the time the present paper is published; more 
durable are the press releases issued at the time and shortly after AP6 was announced (Howard et al. 
2005 and Downer and Campbell 2005).  Of greater technical interest is the 66-page ABARE technical 
report issued at the Inaugural Meeting (Fisher et al. 2006).   In our assessment of AP6 against effective 
and efficient climate policy, we include some of the key literature cited by Fisher et al (2006), notably 
Matysek et al. (2005), an earlier ABARE report, and Montgomery and Smith (2006), a report by CRA 
International in Washington DC; and we have also considered Ford et al. (2006), a subsequent 
ABARE conference paper; and Ahammad et al. (2006), an ABARE report in July.
6 
 
  The first point to discuss is how far the above literature recognises the risk of dangerous, 
anthropogenic climate change.  The language used is very muted.  The AP6 Vision Statement says 
"we will work together...to meet...climate change concerns" while Charter puts as only its third 
purpose to "facilitate attainment of our respective...climate change objectives".  Only in the 
Communique is it stated: "We view climate change in particular as a serious problem".  The need to 
achieve an absolute reduction in GHG emissions is omitted from much of this literature.  In AP6 and 
                                                 
6 This last report is the source of misleading statements in the public discussion that future emissions control 
policies to stabilise GHGs will cost Australia 10% of its GDP − misleading because this comes from an 
unrealistic scenario where Australia creates a carbon price 8 times higher than the rest of the world.   
However, it obviously emphasises the importance of a uniform global price, under which the same report 
estimates the impact on Australian and world GDP to be about 2-3% in 2050, comparable with a range 
around 1% for the world as a whole in Stern (2006).  
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Australian Government documents the dominant language is of "our increased energy needs and the 
associated challenges, including those related to greenhouse gas intensities" (AP6 2005), and there is 
not even a commitment to lowering intensities.  The only mention of "the necessity of lowering global 
greenhouse emissions" is in DFAT (2005), though it is unclear whether this means lower emissions 
absolutely, or relative to a business-as-usual (BAU) projection.  The importance of this is shown by 
the main results in Fisher et al. (2006, p34), where the most optimistic scenario achieves global 
emissions 23% lower than reference case levels: but these reference case levels increase from about 8 
to 22 GtC/yr, so annual emissions more than double even under optimistic assumptions! 
 
  In general, technology-focused climate policy acknowledges fully the need for all major emitters 
to play their part and for rich small emitters to fulfill their responsibilities too.  Specifically with regard 
to AP6, Australian policy pronouncements have emphasised that AP6 countries account for very 
nearly half of current global GHG emissions, and that "working together, this group can have a 
significant impact on global approaches towards climate change" (Downer and Campbell 2005).  We 
can but agree, and point out that because of its size and political importance of its large members, if it 
joined serious negotiations for a post-Kyoto climate treaty, APP would transform them at a stroke.  
Despite the statement that APP is “intended to complement but not replace the Kyoto Protocol” 
(AP6 Charter), it has been argued that in reality it is a competing regime that may lead to obstruction 
(McGee and Taplin 2006). Regarding the Kyoto Protocol, Australian government sources at times 
seem to employ circular reasoning: in the same document, DFAT (2005) notes that AP6 "includes all 
major emitters", yet says that "Australia is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol as it does not provide an 
effective global framework for meeting long-term objectives.  It does not include all major emitters".  
Ford et al. (2006) complete the circle by noting that "The rejection of the Protocol by the United States 
and Australia...seriously undermines its environmental effectiveness." 
 
  With regard to the need for efficient climate policy to use emission pricing as its centrepiece, the 
silence of the technology-focused climate policy literature is nearly deafening.  Particularly noticeable 
is that while Matysek et al. (2005, p5, p55) fully acknowledged the least cost property of emission 
pricing and the wide range of abatement actions it leads to, there is no mention of emission pricing in 
Fisher et al. (2006) and Ford et al. (2006) - and all three papers have Fisher, Ford, Jakeman and 
Matysek as common authors - other than to downplay its effectiveness in stimulating innovation, as 
noted below.  It is notable that ABARE publications on greenhouse policy until 2005 advocated the 
use of market mechanisms for greenhouse gas policy and recognised the potential role of price-
induced innovation (see for example Jakeman et al. 2004), but from 2006 onwards – when the AP6 
initiative became operational – they have strongly supported technology policy and questioned the 
effectiveness of price-based policies. It is also striking that by marginalising market mechanisms, 
technology-focused climate policy ends up being very dirigiste about long-run energy futures, that is,  
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"picking winners".  There are strong presumptions about which technologies, especially clean coal and 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), should be used to achieve "practical results" and hence emissions 
reductions, and which technologies and other actions should not be.  CCS plays a major role in the 
lower-emissions scenarios up to 2050 in Fisher et al. (2006), but not demand-side energy efficiencies 
or substitution in demand. 
 
  As it stands, AP6 is however weakest in its self-declared heartland. As yet there are no 
commitments for serious money to achieve both the deployment of existing low-emissions options, 
and the development and deployment of new low-emissions technologies.  AP6 documents seem to 
assume that just a few hundred million dollars spent on "working together", "enhanced cooperation" 
and "collaboration to promote and create an enabling environment", in the absence of any kind of 
mandatory policies, can work as if like magic in providing "practical results" from tackling the largest 
and most difficult technical, economic and political problem in environmental policy that the world 
has ever faced.  The sums committed to AP6 are paltry by comparison: a total of 100 million A$ over 
5 years by Australia (and separately 500 million A$ through the government’s ‘Low Emissions 
Technology Demonstration Fund’), and a mere 52 million US$ by the United States.
7 This compares 
to estimated average investment needs in the energy sector, without specific efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, of almost 2 billion A$ annually in Australia until 2020 (ERIG 2006). The 
International Energy Agency (2003) estimated energy sector investment needs at over 100 billion US$ 
annually in North America, and over 500 billion US$ per year globally, averaged until 2030.
8  So any 
presumption that AP6 will achieve serious results in stimulating innovation in low carbon technologies 
seems no more than wishful thinking, unless funding was ramped up substantially. 
 
  In the light of this, it is vital to note the vagueness of the methodology stated in Fisher et al. 
(2006) (and also Ford et al. 2006, which gives the same projections).  In particular, no costs of 
developing or deploying new technologies are given, and many quantitative assumptions remain   
implicit and inaccessible. So no explanation or R&D costing is given of how carbon capture 
technologies are expected to fall to an assumed $25-30/tonne, especially given the already noted 
absence of any carbon price or serious government spending on R&D (the reader is referred to 
Matysek et al. 2005, but there the figure is a pure assumption, on p4, p35 and p55).  Finally, even if 
such technology would be available at $25-30/tonne, no reason is given why emitters would deploy it, 
rather than vent carbon dioxide freely to the atmosphere.  It is therefore not surprising that all Fisher et 
                                                 
7 White House “Fact Sheet: The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate”, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060111-8.html, 11 January 2006. 
8 The projections for Australia and North America/World respectively come from different sources with 
different underlying definitions and assumptions.  
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al.'s results are qualified as what AP6 policies "could" achieve rather than what they "will" achieve. 
 
  In Section 2 we noted that although significant government support for R&D is vital, emission 
pricing can also induce significant amounts of innovation.  Central to the contrary view in the market 
mechanisms (that is, emission pricing) section of Fisher et al. (2006, p21) is a claim, directly based on 
Montgomery and Smith (2006), that "market mechanisms cannot send a credible and effective signal 
that would induce the funding required to develop the technologies necessary for achieving deep 
emissions cuts."  This claim assumes there exists a single, as yet undisovered innovation, which once 
discovered and widely implemented will reduce CO2 emissions, and hence their social cost, to low 
levels.  But if such a technology had been discovered, the claim goes, there would be no reason ex post 
for governments to maintain a high emission price, and hence no market repayment of the fixed costs 
of discovering the technology.  In reality, there is no reason to suppose that a single technological fix 
exists.  For even if CCS is the "winner", there is no single CCS technology that will be suitable for all 
ages and locations of power stations.   More significant for our purposes is Montgomery and Smith's 
acceptance that a "relatively low" emission price may be justifiable "to motivate emission reductions 
through changes in utilization of the existing capital stock, or new capital investments using existing 
technologies", even though they greatly downplay how much reduction can be thus achieved. 
 
  We contend that, whether or not it is considered "relatively low", a moderate emissions price, 
phased in soon, is vital in stimulating a large part of the economically available abatement.  A 
significant piece of evidence for this view is Table M in Matysek et al. (2005), which identifies just 
over half the abatement in global CO2 emissions in 2050 as coming from switching from higher to 
lower carbon-intensive fuels, improving energy efficiency, shifts in industry output towards less 
emissions-intensive commodities, and actions by households to reduce fuel use. Note the contrast to 
the AP6 launch report (Fisher et al. 2006), which put emphasis on supply-side technology measures 
such as CCS. 
 
  A final general feature of technology-focused climate policy documents is that they present false 
dichotomies.  "Technology policy" is presented as self-evidently superior to a single other climate 
policy, when in fact many other, complex and continuous policy choices are available, 
overwhelmingly so if the time horizon stretches to several decades hence.  A stark choice is often 
presented between a policy (like AP6) which is claimed to complement economic development and 
energy security goals and to move towards including all major emitters, and a policy (like Kyoto) 
which is claimed to both "frustrate" these goals and to be ineffective because it leaves out many major 
emitters (Downer and Campbell 2005, DFAT 2005).  This ignores the countless developments which 
might follow on from Kyoto after 2012. It also ignores the facts that reducing economic growth does 
not necessarily mean abandoning growth altogether, and avoiding development being "frustrated"  
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cannot mean ignoring environmental issues, since both economic output and environmental quality are 





  We have set out here the elements of an effective and efficient policy to tackle global climate 
change: the largest and most difficult problem in environmental policy the world has ever faced.  For 
policy to be effective, global emissions of greenhouse gases need to be cut, which means involving all 
major emitters, while not excusing rich small emitters from meeting their responsibilities too.  For 
policy to be efficient, at least two broad policy elements are required: fairly uniform, pervasive 
emission pricing from taxes, permit trading, or combinations of the two; and significant government 
support for innovation of new, low-emission technologies, via a mixture of patents, prizes, subsidies 
and direct spending.  We have not pretended that such an ideal policy mix is remotely easy to achieve 
in practice: it remains by far the largest and hardest task that environmental policy has ever faced.  But 
it does serve as a yardstick against which to compare various current policy initiatives. 
 
  Our comparison argued that the kind of technology-focused climate policy currently promoted by 
Australia and the USA under the AP6 umbrella falls far short of the ideal. Key inconvenient truths 
have been ignored about the economics of climate policy, especially the need to use emission pricing 
soon to stimulate both cost-effective abatement actions now and enough technological innovation for 
the future.  Unrealistic assumptions have been made about how much innovation can be achieved by 
voluntarism and cooperation supported by only paltry funding, in the absence of either market price 
incentives or mandatory measures.  Market flexibility has been rejected in favour of costly dirigisme, 
by over-prescribing which types of abatement should be used most.  Technology-focused policy and 
the Kyoto Protocol approach have been falsely presented as incompatible, which ignores the 
possibility of combining them, and many other options worth considering for a suite of climate 
policies to last well into the 21
st century.  As a result, purely technology-focused climate policy will 
either be very inefficient or very ineffective.  Given current funding, we fear the latter, meaning that 
countries exclusively following such policies will be literally fiddling while carbon burns. 
 
  That said, any climate initiative that has the United States, China and India on board of course has 
an immense potential to make a difference for global climate change, at least in principle. And it is 
clear that technology policy, including for carbon capture and storage, will need to play a vital part in 
efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions into the future.  Two things are needed to make 
current Australian and AP6 climate policy effective and efficient: devoting meaningful resources to 
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Appendix: How a shift towards emission pricing can lower overall 
taxation and increase welfare 
 
Suppose that c = constant marginal private cost of electricity, p = price of electricity = cost + tax (if 
any), q(p) = quantity of electricity consumed (q′ < 0), a = spending on abatement, e(q,a) = rate of 
emissions (eq > 0, ea < 0), and I = consumers' income. 
 
Under Policy 1, the government raises revenue a directly by general taxation which does not affect 
electricity consumption, and spends a on abatement.  The price of electricity is p1 = c.  Consumers get 
q1 = q(c) electricity, I–cq1–a other goods, and emissions are e1 := e(q1,a). 
 
Under  Policy 2, the government imposes a small tax of t on electricity, and reduces abatement 
spending (and hence total taxation) to a−b.  The price of electricity is p2 = c+t.  Consumers get q2 = 
q(c+t) < q1 electricity.  The government gets q2t revenue from electricity tax, and now raises only a–
q2t−b directly by general taxation.  So consumers get q2 electricity, I – (c+t)q2 – (a–q2t−b) = I–cq2–a+b 
other goods, and emissions are still e1 = e(q1,a) = e(q2,a−b). (b is chosen so that this equality holds 
exactly.) 
 
Then to first order, the net changes from Policy 1 to Policy 2 are: 
- the value of the change in electricity consumption q2–q1 is –c(q1–q2), since c is the price and 
therefore unit value of electricity; 
- the value of changed spending on other goods is I–cq2–a+b – (I–cq1–a) = c(q1–q2)+b; 
So the net effects of using Policy 2 instead of Policy 1 are to increase the value of all consumer 
spending by b, the reduction in overall taxation, while leaving emissions unchanged.  So the overall 
effect must be to increase welfare. 
 
(The above is a simple partial equilibrium model that, among other things, does not allow for a rising 
marginal cost of electricity.  However, allowing for this would just add complexity without changing 
the basic conclusion.) 